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Kimmo Kääriäinen 
Krise der Moral oder unmoralische Gesellschaft? 
Russische Werte nach dem Kollaps des Kommunismus 
Bericht des BIOst Nr. 26/1997 
Kurzfassung 
Vorbemerkung 
Häufig ist die Rede von der "Krise der Moral" oder dem "Wertevakuum" in Rußland. 
Gemeint sind damit das Fehlen allgemein akzeptierter Werte und Moralprinzipien nach dem 
Zusammenbruch des Kommunismus und alle negativen Phänomene in der russischen 
Gesellschaft, wie beispielsweise die zunehmende Kriminalität. In der russischen Gesellschaft 
ist eine Krise der Moral evident – es gibt keine allgemein akzeptierten Werte, die die frühere 
kommunistische Moral ersetzen könnten. Auf der Ebene des Individuums bestehen hingegen 
hohe Moralprinzipien, die zu einem großen Teil denen in den meisten europäischen Ländern 
ähneln. In dieser Hinsicht ist es übertrieben, von einer "Krise der Moral" unter den 
Durchschnittsrussen zu sprechen. 
Die heutige russische Gesellschaft kann kaum mit dem Begriff "Wertevakuum" 
charakterisiert werden. Im Gegenteil: Der Begriff "Wertedschungel" ist geeigneter, die 
postkommunistische russische Gesellschaft zu beschreiben. In dieser Hinsicht unterscheidet 
sich Rußland nicht so sehr von anderen europäischen Ländern, in denen es verschiedene 
ideologische und religiöse Richtungen gibt, die ihre eigenen Wertesysteme haben. Aber in 
Rußland ist der ideologische Hintergrund ein anderer: Die Russen sind nicht gewohnt, 
zwischen verschiedenen ideologischen Richtungen zu wählen. Deshalb ist besonders die 
jüngere Generation im "Wertedschungel" "verloren" und kann kein einheitliches Weltbild mit 
einem bestimmten Wertesystem entwickeln. Trotz allem haben die meisten Russen klare 
Moralprinzipien in bezug auf die verschiedensten Lebensbereiche. 
Wichtigstes Quellenmaterial zu dieser Studie bilden drei Umfragen in Rußland aufgrund der 
World Values surveys. Die erste gesamtrußländische Umfrage fand im Januar 1991 statt (noch 
zu Zeiten des kommunistischen Systems), die zweite im August 1993 und die dritte im März-
April 1996. In jedem Jahr wurden 1.500-2.000 Russen in ganz Rußland befragt. Dieses 
empirische Material ist Teil eines gemeinsamen Forschungsprojekts der Finnischen 
Akademie und der Rußländischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Es wird in dieser Studie 
erstmals veröffentlicht. 
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Ergebnisse 
1. Die frühere offizielle Ideologie, der Marxismus-Leninismus, hat keine Gültigkeit mehr. 
Auch die alten kommunistischen Ideale und Moralprinzipien in der Bildung haben ihre 
Gültigkeit verloren. In dieser Hinsicht gibt es eine Krise, eine Krise der theoretischen 
Moralauffassung in Rußland. Jedoch auf der individuellen Ebene haben die 
kommunistischen Prinzipien schon lange vor dem Zusammenbruch des kommunistischen 
Systems viel an Bedeutung verloren. Gegen Ende des kommunistischen Regimes dachten 
die meisten, daß es keine klar umrissenen Kriterien für "Gut" und "Böse" gibt. Diese 
Einstellung hat sich nicht wesentlich geändert. Besonders für die jüngere Generation ist es 
schwer, Moralprinzipien als Leitbilder für ihr Leben zu finden. 
2. Die Russen betrachten die Familie als wichtigsten Lebensbereich: für praktisch alle (94%) 
ist die Familie wichtig. Familienwerte und Sexualmoral werden von mehreren Faktoren 
beeinflußt. Das traditionelle russische Erbe, das stark familienorientiert ist, läßt sich in der 
Haltung der Menschen erkennen. Westlicher Einfluß mit zunehmender Betonung des 
Individualismus hat diese Tradition nicht verdrängen können. Die anderen 
Ausgangspunkte sind das kommunistische Erbe und die Realität in der sowjetischen 
Gesellschaft. Sie erklären einige Aspekte der Sexualmoral, in denen sich die russischen 
Werte von denen in anderen europäischen Ländern stark unterscheiden. 
3. Ein Gebiet der Ethik, auf dem sich viele Veränderungen in Rußland vollzogen haben, ist 
die Arbeitsethik. Die ältere Generation hat eine verantwortungsbewußte Einstellung zur 
Arbeit, und die meisten sind immer gewillt, ihr Bestes unabhängig vom Gehalt zu leisten. 
Im Gegensatz dazu betrachtet die jüngere Generation die Arbeit als Job nach dem Prinzip: 
Je mehr gezahlt wird, desto mehr wird geleistet. Die meisten Russen haben eine positive 
Einstellung zum Wettbewerb; doch ist eine abnehmende Tendenz in dieser Einstellung 
feststellbar. Im Gegensatz zu früher glauben heute mehr Menschen, daß nicht schwere 
Arbeit, sondern Beziehungen zu einem besseren Leben führen. Besonders unter der 
jüngeren Generation hat sich diese Einstellung wesentlich geändert. Obwohl viele Russen 
glauben, daß das Einkommen von der Leistung abhängen sollte, bestehen sie auf mehr 
Gleichheit der Einkommen. In dieser Hinsicht haben sich die Meinungen zwischen 1991 
und 1996 wesentlich geändert. Die größten Veränderungen können bei denen festgestellt 
werden, die während der wirtschaftlichen Transformation besonders gelitten haben, d.h. 
die ältere Generation und Menschen mit einem niedrigen Bildungsniveau. 
4. In bezug auf die Meinungen über die wesentlichsten Aufgaben des Staates sind für die 
Russen die praktischen Dinge (wie stabile Wirtschaft, Aufrechterhaltung der Ordnung im 
Land und Kampf gegen das Verbrechen) wichtiger als die mehr abstrakten und humanen 
Ziele der Gesellschaft. Hinsichtlich des gegenseitigen Vertrauens der Menschen können im 
Zeitraum 1991-1996 beunruhigende Tendenzen festgestellt werden: Eine große Mehrheit 
hat kein Vertrauen zu anderen Menschen. Ein anderer bedenklicher Trend ist das Fehlen 
von Moralprinzipien unter der jüngeren Generation in bezug auf verschiedene praktische 
gesellschaftliche Probleme. 
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5. Die russische Orthodoxie vertritt "hohe" moralische Prinzipien, doch unter den Durch-
schnittsmenschen finden die Lehren wenig Akzeptanz. Nur ein Drittel der Russen betrach-
ten sich als Gläubige, und wenn wir versuchen, eine Gruppe zu ermitteln, die zumindest in 
einem bestimmten Grad die "wahre Orthodoxie" vertritt, so können nur fünf Prozent der 
Russen als Vertreter dieser Gruppe gelten. Außerdem sind "wahre orthodoxe Gläubige" 
eine Minderheit, die hauptsächlich aus älteren Frauen mit niedrigem Bildungsniveau 
besteht. Darüber hinaus äußerten sie nur bei einigen Fragen der Moral eine "höhere" Moral 
als die Respondenten mit ähnlichem demographischen Hintergrund. Im Gegensatz dazu 
äußerten Atheisten eher hohe Moralwerte, besonders in bezug auf verschiedene soziale 
Aufgaben und auf Ehrlichkeit. Es gibt keinen Beweis dafür, daß die Orthodoxie die 
Lösung für die "Krise der Moral" bietet. 
6. Die Durchschnittsrussen haben ziemlich hohe Moralprinzipien, die sich nicht wesentlich 
von denen in den meisten europäischen Ländern unterscheiden. Doch gibt es in der 
russischen Gesellschaft zahlreiche Charakteristika, die als "unmoralisch" betrachtet 
werden können, wie weitverbreitete Korruption, zunehmende Kriminalität usw. Deshalb 
besteht in bezug auf die Moral ein Widerspruch in der jetzigen russischen Gesellschaft: 
Einerseits gibt es viel "Moralpotential" unter den Durchschnittsrussen, doch ist es 
andererseits schwer, nach den eigenen Prinzipien zu leben (wie dies auch unter dem 
kommunistischen Regime der Fall war). In dieser Hinsicht ist die "Krise der Moral" zuerst 
eine Krise des Systems. Die Zukunft ist nicht rosig, weil es unter der jüngeren Generation 
auch an Moralprinzipien fehlt. Deshalb kann sich die "Krise der Moral" in der Zukunft 
ausweiten. 
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Background 
Currently, there is much talk of a "moral crisis" or loss of values in Russia. These terms refer 
to the lack of commonly accepted values and moral principles following the collapse of 
communism and to the emergence of a number of negative phenomena in Russian society, 
such as increasing criminality. 
In Russian society as a whole a "moral crisis" is indeed evident – the moral principles of com-
munism have been abandoned and there is no alternative commonly accepted value system to 
take their place. By contrast, individual Russians profess to hold moral principles similar to 
those prevailing in most European countries. It would thus be an exaggeration to speak of a 
"moral crisis" among ordinary Russians. 
Contemporary Russian society is characterised not so much by a lack of values as by a myriad 
of competing ideological and religious movements each offering its own value system. In this 
sense, Russia does not differ all that much from other European countries. What is different is 
the ideological background: after living for decades under a one-party system Russians are 
unaccustomed to discriminating between different ideologies. Amid the "jungle" of 
conflicting viewpoints, young people, in particular, find it difficult to form a coherent view of 
the world with a defined value system. For all that, most Russians hold clear moral principles 
concerning various areas of life. 
Both Russian politicians and the Russian Orthodox Church have claimed that religion, 
particularly Orthodoxy, offers a way out of the "moral crisis" in Russia. It has been proposed 
that Orthodoxy should resume its traditional role as the "moral backbone" of Russian society. 
One of the first people to appeal to the Church for help in overcoming the "moral crisis" of 
Soviet society was Mikhail Gorbachev. Since then, Orthodoxy has become more visible and 
has considerably enhanced its social status. When communism collapsed, the Church offered 
the only alternative system of values that could have replaced communist morality. At the 
same time there was a tendency to idealise the role of the Church as a moral authority in pre-
revolutionary Russian society and to ignore the problems of Russian society before 1917. 
While it is natural that Russian politicians should try to find solutions for contemporary 
problems in the past, this cannot be done without a critical and open discussion of the 
country's history. Furthermore, it makes no sense simply to adopt structures that existed at the 
beginning of the century and expect them to function in contemporary Russia. 
This study examines moral values in Russia after the collapse of communism, looking 
particularly at changes that took place between 1991 and 1996. It begins with an examination 
of opinions regarding the foundations for morality in Russia and then goes on to explore 
attitudes to sexual morality, work, and social responsibility. Finally it looks at the influence of 
Orthodoxy on Russian morality. In each section the tendencies and changes during the period 
in question are examined, first generally and then in terms of various demographic variables, 
such as age, gender or level of education. 
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Sources for the Study 
The empirical data used in this study are based on three World Values surveys carried out in 
Russia. The World Values project has been under way since the late 1970s. It includes a ver-
satile set of interviews that has been used to study the opinions of tens of thousands of people 
all over the world. The surveys used in this study were carried out in January 1991 (when the 
communist system still existed), in August 1993 and in March-April 1996. On each occasion 
1,500-2,000 people were interviewed all over Russia. The questionnaire was adapted to make 
it relevant to Russia. The empirical material thus gathered forms part of a joint research 
project between the Academy of Finland and the Russian Academy of Sciences. The 
fieldwork was carried out by Professor Andreenkov's research group. 
1. The Foundations for Morality in Russia 
Ethics and morality in Russia were previously based on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. 
Communist theory defined the moral norms of Soviet society and provided an absolute foun-
dation for morality.1 Following the collapse of communism no alternative moral theory 
emerged to replace communist theory as a national doctrine. Neither is there any agreement 
about what the foundations for morality in post-communist Russia ought to be. The following 
statistics show how people's opinions about the foundations for morality have changed since 
early 1991: 
The Distribution of Opinions Regarding the Foundations for Morality (1991-1996, in %) 
(331)2 Here are two statements which people sometimes make when discussing good and evil. 
Which one comes closest to your own point of view? 
A. There are clear-cut criteria for defining what is good or evil. These always apply to every-
one, whatever the circumstances. 
B. Good and evil can never be clearly defined. What is good or evil depends entirely upon the 
circumstances at the time. 
 1991 1993 1996 
Good and evil can be clearly 
defined 
28 31 34 
Depends on the circumstances 56 56 50 
Disagree with both 6 5 6 
Don't know 10 8 10 
Most Russians think that there are no clear-cut criteria for defining good and evil. This was 
the case even in early 1991, despite the fact that communist moral doctrine had for decades 
defined good and evil in absolute terms. However, these teachings were not generally 
accepted by ordinary people. Soviet reality often made it necessary to distinguish between a 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Osnovy marksistkoi-leninskoi etiki, Minsk, 1965, pp. 6-8; O. G. Drobnitskii, Ponyatie 
morali. Istoriko-kriticheskii ocherk, Moscow, 1974, pp. 181-184. For more detail about the Soviet 
background, see Kimmo Kääriäinen, Die Ethik-Diskussion in Rußland, Berichte des BIOSt, Nr. 56/1995. 
2 The number refers to the number of the relevant question in the survey questionnaire. 
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"real" and an "expedient" truth, so it was difficult to believe that good and evil could be 
defined in absolute terms.3 It would, therefore, be an oversimplification to say that the present 
moral crisis has been brought about entirely by the collapse of communism and its value 
system. 
At the official level the abandoning of Marxism-Leninism as an ideology brought major prob-
lems of orientation. The lack of agreement about an alternative value system poses a problem 
of how to teach morality in schools, for instance. Among individuals, however, the 
ideological landmarks had already begun to shift long before the end of the communist 
regime. People had ceased to pay much attention to ideological or political matters and 
concerned themselves more with the practical aspects of everyday life--family, friends and 
work. This "micro-environment" has not changed so drastically in the post-communist era. 
With regard to most moral questions, including the foundations for morality, there are notable 
differences between age-groups. In 1996, only one in four (27%) of the youngest group of 
respondents (18-28 years) thought good and evil could be defined in absolute terms, whereas 
60% held the opposite view. Among the older generation, by contrast, a higher than average 
percentage of respondents thought good and evil could be universally defined: in the age-
group 60-69 years 42% shared this view and among the oldest group of respondents (70 years 
and over) the figure was half. This distribution is also reflected in the responses to more de-
tailed questions concerning moral issues: while older people tend to adhere to clearly defined 
moral principles, a kind of moral relativism is typical of the younger generations. 
2. Family Values and Sexual Morality 
Russians regard the family as the most important area of life: 94% of those questioned said 
they regarded the family as important. Therefore, it is important to examine what kind of 
moral principles guide their family life and sexual morality. Since these are aspects of ethics 
that concern the personal sphere, most people are likely to hold clear views on them. The first 
matter examined is the relationship between parents and children. The following statistics 
show how Russians view two aspects of this relationship. 
The Distribution of Opinions Regarding the Relationship Between Parents and Children 
(1991-1996, in %). 
(451) With which of these two statements do you tend to agree? 
A. Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and 
respect them. 
One does not have a duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behav-
iour and attitudes. 
 1991 1993 1996 
Should always love parents 70 70 75 
Parents have to earn love and respect 23 26 19 
                                                 
3 Yurii Levada, Sovetskii prostoi chelovek, Moscow, 1993, pp. 42-43. 
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Don't know 7 4 7 
(452) Which of the following statements best describes your views about parents' responsi-
bilities to their children? 
A. Parents' duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-
being. 
B. Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being 
for the sake of their children. 
 1991 1993 1996 
Parents should do their best for their children 48 52 49 
Parents have their own life 33 31 29 
Disagree with both 13 13 16 
Don't know 6 4 6 
Three out of four Russians (75%) think that one should always love one's parents, regardless 
of what their qualities and faults are. This is a very high percentage in comparison with other 
European countries and indicates the strong orientation towards the family in Russia. Age 
does not play any significant role in these attitudes. Furthermore, no significant change in 
opinions is observable since 1991. Consequently, the predominant attitude in Russia has been 
and still is the "traditional" one – namely, that children should always love and respect their 
parents. 
The response to the question about parents' responsibilities also indicated an adherence to tra-
dition. Increasing individualism in other areas of life seems to have had no influence on 
family values. Again, no significant change can be detected following the collapse of 
communism. Here, however, age does seem to play a role: the oldest respondents most often 
think that parents should sacrifice their lives for their children. 
In each year of the World Values survey the respondents were asked about sexual freedom. 
Here again, no significant changes could be noted after 1991. Therefore the figures given here 
are for 1996 only. 
The Age Distribution of Opinions Regarding Sexual Freedom (1996, in %) 
(423) Would you agree or disagree with the statement that people should be able to have total 
sexual freedom? 
 18-28 29-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70- total 
Tend to agree  31 18 15  8  6  4 16 
Tend to disagree 38 48 56 65 58 53 52 
Neither/depends  22 23 17 14 11  5 18 
Don't know  8 10 12 12 26 37 1 
(444) Do you accept the idea of a woman wanting to have a child without having a permanent 
relationship with a man? 
 18-28 29-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70- total 
Accept 41 43 42 34 28 22 38 
Don't accept 19 17 20  30  37  36 24 
Depends 33 34 35  31  28  29 33 
Moral Crisis or Immoral Society? 11 
Don't know  7  6  3   3   6  11  5 
Only a minority of Russians accept total sexual freedom. In this respect the youngest genera-
tion is most liberal: one-third of them (31%) accept total sexual freedom. However, even in 
this group a greater proportion (38%) does not accept total sexual freedom. Since 1991 no 
significant changes can be noted in any age-group, although the freedom of the mass media 
has increased considerably with regard to sexual matters. All kinds of publications 
encouraging sexual freedom are available but they appear so far not to have had any impact 
on values. 
Russians tend to accept the idea of a woman wanting to have a child without having a perma-
nent relationship with a man: more than one-third (38%) clearly accept it and another third 
(33%) think that it depends on the situation. Only a quarter (24%) do not accept sexual free-
dom of this kind. There are clear differences between age-groups. The most liberal are those 
between the ages of 29 and 39. An obvious reason for this is that the issue is most relevant to 
this age-group. The oldest group, by contrast, responded most negatively to the question. 
There is also a significant difference between men and women: only one-third of men (33%) 
accept the idea of a woman wanting to have a child without being in a permanent relationship, 
whereas 42% of women accept it. In most cases women have more "traditional" values than 
men, but in this case, where it is the freedom of women that is at issue, women are more 
liberal than men. 
A very important aspect of sexual morality is the issue of abortion. For some people this is a 
question that can only be resolved one way or the other: either one accepts abortion or one 
does not. Normally, however, there are a number of special circumstances that are taken into 
account when considering the ethics of abortion. The following statistics show how Russians 
view these abortion indicators. 
The Age Distribution of Opinions Regarding Indicators for Abortion (1996, %) 
(465) Would you accept an abortion in the following situations? 
A. When pregnancy could threaten the woman's health 
 
 18-28 29-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70- total 
Accept 78 80 80 76 67 61 76 
Don't accept 13 13 12 16 19 25 15 
Don't know  9  6  9  8 14 14  9 
 
B. When it is very probable that the child will be born with physical disabilities 
 
 18-28 29-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70- total 
Accept 84 87 82 84 71 59 81 
Don't accept  6  5  7 11 15 27  9 
Don't know.  9  8 10  6 14 14 10 
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C. When the woman is not married 
 
 18-28 29-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70- total 
Accept 40 41 39 36 32 24 37 
Don't accept 37 33 34 40 40 46 37 
Don't know 24 25 28 24 27 28 26 
 
D. When the parents do not want to have any more children 
 
 18-28 29-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70- total 
Accept 61 63 60 61 41 39 57 
Don't accept 20 20 23 27 35 43 25 
Don't know 19 17 17 12 24 17 18 
Abortion is widely accepted in a situation when it is very probable that the child will be born 
with physical disabilities. This percentage is even higher (81%) than when pregnancy could 
threaten the woman's health (76%). These are the two most commonly accepted reasons for 
abortion in most European countries; however, normally they are listed in the opposite order. 
This difference may be explained by the way handicapped children (and adults) were treated 
in the former Soviet Union. They were generally shut up in mental hospitals or other 
institutions and isolated from society. In this respect little has changed since the collapse of 
communism. Furthermore, it takes time to change attitudes. 
A clear majority of Russians accepts abortion in a situation when the parents do not want to 
have any more children. This percentage is notably higher than in other countries. This 
attitude may be explained by the fact that for decades abortion was one of the most widely 
used means of contraception in the Soviet Union. There were hardly any other means of 
contraception available and those that were available were of very poor quality. Although 
there are now other methods available, Russians have become used to regarding abortion as a 
"normal" means of contraception. The number of abortions has decreased somewhat in recent 
years: in 1994 there were 3 million abortions, but in 1995 "only" 2.7 million. This figure is 
still extremely high, especially in comparison with the number of births, which was 1.3 
million--i. e., half the number of abortions.4 
Here there are differences between age-groups. As with other aspects of sexual morality, 
older people hold stricter moral principles. However, in the case of abortion these differences 
are not as significant as they are on other issues. The older generations have after all lived for 
many years in a society where abortion was widely used and accepted. In all cases mentioned 
women accepted abortion slightly more often than men. 
                                                 
4 Just how high the abortion rate is in Russia becomes evident when a comparison is made with another 
country with similar abortion legislation. Finland is an example of a country with rather liberal abortion 
legislation. However, in 1995 there were fewer than 10,000 abortions and 63,200 children were born. 
Helsingin Sanomat, 21.12.1996. 
14 Berichte des BIOst 1997 
On several matters of sexual morality respondents were asked to place their opinions on a ten-
point scale, ranging from "never justified" to "always justified". The following statistics show 
the percentage of respondents who expressed clearly negative opinions concerning several 
matters of sexual morality. 
(565) The Age Distribution of Respondents Who Think the Practices Listed Are Never 
Justified (1996, in %) 
 18-28 29-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70- total 
Married persons having an affair 22 28 35 43 52 63 36 
Homosexuality 61 67 75 80 82 80 72 
Prostitution 43 52 66 78 80 82 63 
Divorce  6  7  7 11 10  9  8 
The issue that received the most negative response was homosexuality, with almost three out 
of four respondents (72%) rejecting it. This percentage is much higher than in other European 
countries where the discussion goes on at a totally different level, e.g. whether homosexuals 
should have the right to marry or even to have a church wedding. One explanation for the 
very high percentage of people who think homosexuality is "never justified" may be that in 
the former Soviet Union homosexuality was censured and was considered a criminal offence 
because it did not fit in with the concept of the "new Soviet man". The youngest generation 
(18-28 years) is somewhat more tolerant than the others, but even among this age-group a 
clear majority thinks that homosexuality is never justified. 
There is a great difference in opinion between age-groups regarding extra-marital affairs. 
Three times as many people in the oldest group said they thought this was never justified as in 
the youngest group. Prostitution is generally regarded as never justified: almost two out of 
three people (63%) hold this opinion. Here again, there is a great difference between the 
oldest and the youngest age-groups: twice as many people in the oldest group thought that 
prostitution was never justified as in the youngest group. Divorce, on the contrary, is rarely 
regarded as never justified. Less than one-tenth (8%) of respondents held this opinion and age 
did not play any significant role. Divorce has been and still is such a common phenomenon in 
Russia that people do not regard it in a very negative light. 
Russian family values and attitudes to sexual morality have been shaped by a number of influ-
ences. First of all, the Russian tradition is very strongly family-orientated and has remained so 
despite the influence of the West, with its increasing emphasis on individualism. At the same 
time, Russian attitudes to certain aspects of sexual morality clearly bear the mark of 
communist ideology and of Soviet reality. In these areas Russians hold rather different views 
to their European counterparts. 
3. Work Ethics 
In attitudes towards work many changes have taken place in Russia. As the transition to a 
market economy got under way, people became sceptical about the desirability of the changes 
that it entailed. They realised that a market economy would not automatically ensure them a 
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high standard of living and their views of the West became more realistic. Nonetheless, most 
people have a positive attitude to competition and they recognize the importance of hard 
work. As the following statistics show, almost all Russians (90%) believe that a person's 
salary should depend on his performance. 
Opinions About Linking Salary to Performance (1996, in %) 
(277) Imagine two secretaries of the same age, doing practically the same job. One finds out 
that the other earns 100,000 roubles more than she does. The better- paid secretary, however, 
is quicker, more efficient and more reliable. Do you think is it fair that one secretary is paid 
more than the other? 
Fair 90 
Not fair  5 
Don't know  5 
A good salary is regarded as the most important factor in connection with work (90% of re-
spondents regarded it as important). After that come an interesting job (65%), pleasant col-
leagues (64%) and job security (62%). Aspects of work that are regarded as not so important 
are a responsible job (only 18% regarded it as important), not much pressure (19%), meeting 
people (21%) and chances for promotion (22%). These results differ somewhat from those of 
most European countries, especially as far as the importance of a good salary is concerned. 
The definition of what constitutes a good salary is, however, rather different in Russia to else-
where. In a country where a large proportion of the population lives in poverty and the aver-
age salary of 200 USD is scarcely enough to live on (especially in big cities), a "good salary" 
simply means enough money to cover essentials. 
In order to examine attitudes to work in more detail, respondents were asked to choose be-
tween a number of possible motives for working. 
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The Age Distribution of Attitudes to Work (1996, in %) 
(270) Here are some statements about what makes people work. No matter whether you have 
a job or not, which of the following statements comes closest to your own viewpoint? 
 
 18-28 29-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70 male female total 
Work is a commodity: 
 
the more I earn the 
the harder I work 31 31 26 18 14 8 34 16 24 
 
I always do my best 
 
independent of the salary 21 25 37 41 50 52 31 38 35 
 
Work is a necessity 
 
I would not work if I did 21 26 19 18 19 16 16 24 20 
not have to 
 
I like to work, but I do 
not let work interfere 15 10 9 8 6 2 9 10 9 
with my life 
 
I love my job - it is the 
most important thing 
in my life 3 4 6 12 8 9 7 6 6 
 
I have never had a job 5 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 
 
Don't know 3 4 3 3 4 12 3 5 4 
There are significant differences between age-groups regarding motives for working. One-
third of the youngest group regard work as a commodity: the more they earn the harder they 
are prepared to work. This attitude is not typical of the older groups. A responsible attitude 
towards work is found most often among older people. Half of the respondents of 60 years or 
more said that they always did their best independent of the salary, whereas only one-fifth of 
the youngest group (18-28) said this. Men regard work as a commodity twice as often as 
women. Accordingly, women say more often than men that they always do their best inde-
pendent of the salary. Quite a high percentage of respondents (20%) said they would not work 
if they did not have to. This attitude is found more frequently among women than among 
men, which probably reflects the fact that most Russian women bear the double burden of 
taking care of the housework and children as well as going out to work. 
Another aspect of work ethics examined was attitudes to authority. Respondents were asked 
to say under what circumstances one should follow the instructions of one's superior. The 
following statistics show how attitudes changed between 1991 and 1996. 
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The Distribution of Opinions with Regard to Following Instructions at Work (1991-1996, 
in %) 
(279) People have different ideas about following instructions at work. Some people think one 
should follow the instructions of one's superior even if one does not fully agree with him. 
Others think one should follow instructions only if one is convinced that they are right. With 
which of these two opinions do you agree? 
 1991 1993 1996 
Should follow instructions 18 22 31 
Must be convinced first 54 43 33 
Depends 25 31 30 
Don't know 3 4 5 
On this question attitudes changed considerably between 1991 and 1996. In 1991 fewer than 
one in five respondents (18%) thought one should always follow instructions, whereas in 
1996 one-third of the respondents (31%) shared this view. In 1991 more than half (54%) of 
the respondents thought one should only follow instructions one agreed with, whereas in 1996 
only one-third held this opinion. Given the authoritarian nature of the communist regime, it 
might have been expected that people would have been more inclined to follow the 
instructions of superiors under communism than under market conditions. The tendency has, 
however, been the opposite. One obvious reason for this is that market conditions have 
brought much greater job insecurity. 
After the collapse of communism incomes became much more unequal. The following 
statistics show how people's attitudes to equality of incomes have changed. Respondents were 
asked to place their views on a ten-point scale at one end of which was the statement 
"incomes should be made more equal" and at the other end "we need larger income 
differences as incentives for individual effort". 
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Opinions About the Equality of Incomes (1991-1996, in %) 
 1991 1993 1996 
Incomes should be made 
more equal 
1  4  9 15 
2  2  4  8 
3  4  8 11 
4  4  8  9 
5 12 21 18 
6  8  8  6 
7 13 12  9 
8 15 12  7 
9  6  4  4 
10 22 10  9 
Don't know 11  4  4 
There should be 
larger income 
differences 
The two extreme ends of the scale (1 and 10) show clearly that there has been a big change in 
attitudes towards equality of incomes. The percentage of Russians who think that incomes 
should be made more equal has increased from 4% to 15% and the percentage of those who 
think that there should be larger income differences as incentives for individual effort has de-
creased from 22% to 9%. In 1991 26% placed themselves in the first five categories – i.e., 
they favoured greater equality of incomes over greater discrepancies. In 1993 this figure was 
half and in 1996, 61%. 
Age plays a significant role in attitudes to equality of incomes. In each year of study the older 
groups said more frequently than the others that they favoured equal incomes. In 1996 one 
third (34%) of respondents aged 70 years or over placed themselves at the lowest end of the 
scale and only 2% at the other end. Three out of four of them favoured equal incomes to at 
least some degree i.e., they placed themselves between 1 and 5 on the scale. Among younger 
people, by contrast, the opposite view was more strongly represented; however, even among 
these age-groups the proportion of respondents who came out firmly in favour of greater in-
come differences (10 on the scale) fell by half between 1991 (25%) and 1996 (13%). 
To some extent the figures for 1991 can be explained by the fact that at that time differences 
in incomes were not very great. The majority of people did not accept this situation. However, 
as a consequence of economic reform, income differences have become enormous and a great 
deal of the population lives in poverty, a situation which the majority of the population finds 
Moral Crisis or Immoral Society? 19 
unacceptable. The greatest change in opinions may be noted among Russians who have suf-
fered most from the social and economic transformation, i. e. older people.5 
An indicator of how strained the situation is are attitudes towards newly rich Russians. 
According to a survey by the Russian Independent Institute of Social and National Problems 
carried out in 1995, nearly half of the Russian population favours the confiscation by violent 
means of the wealth that the newly rich Russians have amassed dishonestly.6 
Another aspect of the market economy is competition. Respondents were asked to place 
themselves on a ten-point scale at one end of which was the statement: "Competition is good. 
It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas." At the other end was the statement: 
"Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people." 
Attitudes to Competition (1991-1996, in %) 
 1991 1993 1996 
Competition is good     
1 32 22 20 
2 11 11  9 
3 14 14 14 
4 7 11 11 
5 11 18 20 
6 3  4  5 
7  4 3  4 
8 3 3  4 
9 1  2  2 
10 3  4 3 
Don't know 11 7 9 
Competition is harmful     
In 1991 one-third of respondents (32%) were entirely convinced of the virtues of competition. 
This percentage had decreased to 22% by 1993, but after that remained relatively stable (20% 
in 1996). If we look at positive attitudes towards competition overall (1-5 on the scale) no no-
                                                 
5 The question about the equality of incomes was put in another way in a survey by the Russian Independent 
Institute of Social and National Problems. The respective counterparts were equal opportunities and equal 
incomes. This survey showed a clear preference for equal opportunities over equal incomes. An 
individualistic model of a society of equal opportunities had on average three times as many supporters as a 
society with equal incomes. Mass Consciousness of the Russians during the Period of Social 
Transformation: Reality versus Myths, Russian Independent Institute of Social and National Problems, 
Moscow, 1996, p. 24. 
6 Ibid., p. 23. 
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table changes have occurred: in each year three out of four respondents (75%) had a positive 
attitude towards competition. Here, too, age plays a significant role. Among the youngest 
group (18-28 years) the percentage of respondents who thought competition was definitely 
good (1 on the scale) was the highest of any group in each year of the study; nevertheless, 
even in this group enthusiasm for competition has waned: in 1991 it was 41%; in 1993, 31%; 
and in 1996, only 23%. Among the oldest group, by contrast, the corresponding percentage 
was always the lowest of any group and fell from 23% in 1991 to 13% in 1993, and by 1996 
was only 8%. 
Attitudes to hard work were also examined using a ten-point scale. The interviewees were 
asked to say to what extent they agreed with the following statements: "In the long run, hard 
work usually brings a better life" and "Hard work does not generally bring success – it is 
more a matter of luck and connections."The following statistics show the changes that took 
place between 1991 and 1996. 
Attitudes to Hard Work (1991-1996, %) 
 1991 1993 1996 
In the long run, hard work   
usually brings a better life   
1 25 18 16 
2 10  8  8 
3 12 12 12 
4  8 11 10 
5 13 18 17 
6  5  6  6 
7  5  8  8 
8  6  8  7 
9  2  4  4 
10  7  6  7 
Don't know  6  2  4 
Success is a matter of luck 
and connections 
In Russia connections have always been important for economic success and promotion. This 
was the case in Russia before the Revolution and remained so under the communist regime. 
In the early 1990s, as a consequence of the transition to a market economy, a large proportion 
of Russians began to think that hard work usually brings a better life. In the course of the 
1990s, however, people have become increasingly sceptical about the truth of this statement. 
In 1991 one-quarter clearly shared this opinion (1 on the scale), whereas the corresponding 
percentages were 18% in 1993 and 16% in 1996. However, in each year a clear majority, 
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approximately two-thirds, had a positive attitude towards hard work (1-5 on the scale). At the 
same time the most negative opinions (10 on the scale) did not increase. In all age-groups the 
proportion of Russians who definitely think that hard work brings a better life has decreased. 
However, two age-groups, the oldest and the youngest, clearly differ from the average 
population. In the oldest group, the proportion of respondents who think that hard work brings 
a better life, was highest in each year. In 1991 one-third (34%) shared this view; in 1993, one-
quarter (24%); and in 1996, 22%. Among the youngest respondents the corresponding 
percentage was the same as the average in 1991 (24%), but after that lower: in 1993, 16% and 
in 1996, only 12%. This tendency is alarming, for it means that the new generation does not 
widely believe in the importance of hard work. 
Another question related to the previous ones concerned wealth. Again two opposing state-
ments were presented and respondents were asked to place their view on a ten-point scale. 
One statement was "People can only get rich at the expense of others" and the other was 
"Wealth can grow so there is enough for everyone." The following statistics show the changes 
that took place between 1991 and 1996. 
Opinions About Wealth (1991-1996, in %) 
 1991 1993 1996 
People can only get rich at 
the expense of others 
1  7  7 10 
2  4  6 7 
3  5  8 11 
4  5  7 6 
5 13  20 19 
6   7 10 8 
7 11 10 7 
8 12 10 7 
9   5  4  4 
10 16 10 8 
Don't know 15  9 12 
Wealth can grow so there 
is enough for everyone 
The distribution of opinions at the two extreme ends of the scale shows an increase in 
negative attitudes towards wealth. The proportion of respondents who definitely think that 
one can get rich only at the expense of others has slightly increased, whereas the proportion 
of those who share the opposite view has decreased. If we consider a larger group, i. e., those 
who tend to think that one can get rich only at the expense of others (1-5 on the scale) this 
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negative tendency becomes more evident. In 1991 a clear minority (34%) shared this view, 
but in 1993 almost half of the respondents did (48%) and in 1996, a slight majority (53%). 
Age played only a minor role with regard to opinions about wealth. All age-groups had 
almost the same percentages as the average. More significant was the respondents' level of 
education. In each year twice as many respondents with the lowest level of education (7 
grades or less) said they thought one could only get rich at the expense of others as 
respondents with the highest level of education. 
4. Social Issues 
The World Values surveys also included several questions about social issues. Issues having a 
bearing on everyday life were always regarded as most important in the former Soviet Union 
and continue to be, as the following statistics show: 
Matters Regarded as Most Important in Russian Society (1991-1996, in %) 
(532) If you had to choose, which one of these things would you say is most important? 
 1991 1993 1996 
Maintaining order in the nation 57 61 64 
 
Giving people more opportunities 
to influence important government  
decisions 23 13 15 
 
Fighting rising prices 14 23 18 
Protecting freedom of speech   2  1  2 
Don't know  3  2 1 
 
(534) Here is another list. In your opinion, which one of these is most important? 
 1991 1993 1996 
A stable economy 63 65 67 
 
Progress towards a less impersonal  
and more humane society  9  8  6 
 
Progress toward a society in which  
ideas count more than money  5  3  4 
 
Fighting crime 20 22 21 
Don't know  2  2  2 
In the first list "maintaining order in the nation" consistently holds first place and is assigned 
increasing importance in each year that the survey was carried out. Russians regard as impor-
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tant those matters that have an impact on their everyday lives. In 1996, for instance, fighting 
rising prices was not regarded as important as it was in 1993 when people were reeling from 
the shock of freeing prices, enormous inflation and other aspects of economic transformation. 
Although protecting freedom of speech was named least often as a matter of priority, this 
does not mean that it is not regarded as important – it was simply considered less important 
than the other matters the respondents were asked to choose from. Furthermore, Russians may 
already have come to take freedom of speech for granted.7 On most matters age did not seem 
to play a significant role. The only exception was "maintaining order in the nation", which 
was assigned particular importance by the youngest (18-28 years) and the oldest (60 years or 
more) respondents. In 1996, 70% of respondents in both these age-groups regarded it as the 
country's most important task. 
In the second list, too, it was evident that practical matters, such as a stable economy or fight-
ing crime, were regarded as much more important than more abstract goals. Only slight 
changes occurred between 1991 and 1996. There were, however, differences between age-
groups: in 1996, a stable economy was regarded as the most important goal by three out of 
four people (73%) in the age-group 30-49 years, whereas only half (53%) of the oldest group 
questioned regarded it as most important. The oldest generation placed more emphasis on 
fighting crime: one-third (35%) of them regarded it as most important. 
One social question about which there is much debate is the issue of freedom versus equality. 
Respondents were asked the following question: 
Opinions About Freedom Versus Equality (1991-1996, in %) 
(477) Which of the following statements comes closer to your own view? 
A. I think that both freedom and equality are important. But if I have to choose one of them, I 
think that personal freedom is more important: then everybody could live freely without re-
strictions on their personal development. 
B. Of course both freedom and equality are important. But if I have to choose one of them, I 
think that equality is more important; then nobody would be in a privileged position and so-
cial differences would not be so large. 
 
 1991 1993 1996 
Freedom is more important 40 45 43 
Equality is more important 42 36 33 
Disagree with both  6  8 10 
Don't know 15 10 14 
                                                 
7 According to a survey of the Russian Independent Institute of Social and National Problems, in 1995, almost 
three out of four Russians (74%) supported freedom of  expression but favoured a ban on the propagation of 
such things as violence and pornography.  Only 13% believed that the freedom of the mass media should be 
restricted by the state and  that they should follow a certain political line. Ibid., p. 17. 
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As can be seen from the table, slight changes in attitudes occurred between 1991 and 1996. 
The percentage of Russians who think that freedom is more important has remained approxi-
mately at the same level, whereas the proportion of those who regard equality as more impor-
tant has decreased. Thus, the communist emphasis on equality seems to be losing its 
influence. However, neither of these statements has the majority's support and the percentage 
of respondents who accept neither freedom nor equality has increased. 
Big differences in opinion on this issue become more apparent when the responses are 
analysed according to age. In each year more than half of the youngest respondents (18-28 
years) regarded freedom as more important than equality. In 1996, 58% of them advocated 
freedom, whereas only one-quarter (24%) came out in favour of equality. The older 
generations generally have the opposite view. In 1996, nearly half of them (47%) supported 
equality and fewer than one in five (18%) thought freedom was more important. With regard 
to education, most respondents with the lowest level of education put equality first, whereas 
the majority of respondents with the highest level of education gave priority to freedom. In 
other words, freedom is supported by those able to take advantage of it, whereas the "weaker" 
sectors of the population believe they are better off under a system with more equality. 
Increasing freedom in Russian society, which is often understood differently in Russia than in 
the West – i.e., as the opportunity to do anything without limitations (volya) and therefore 
often has connotations of lawlessness or anarchy, has had a serious impact on the level of 
trust in society.8 This tendency is evident in the following statistics. 
Opinions About Trusting Other People (1991-1996, in %) 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you have to be 
very careful in dealing with people? 
 1991 1993 1996 
Most people can be trusted 35 29 19 
Have to be very careful 58 66 73 
Don't know  7  5  7 
The table shows a steady "negative" trend – i. e., increasing suspicion between people. This 
tendency to mistrust other people partly explains why friends are uniquely important for Rus-
sians, much more so than in other European countries. Neither age nor educational level 
seemed to make any notable difference to opinions concerning the issue of trust. 
People's attitudes to various practical moral questions were examined using a ten-point scale 
which indicated whether respondents thought that something was always justified, never justi-
fied, or somewhere in between. If the responses of those who chose number 1 on the scale 
(never justified) is analysed according to age, major differences emerge: 
                                                 
8 For more detail, see Tatjana Mazonaschwili, "Unsere Paradoxe: Die Rezeption allgemeinmenschlicher  Werte 
in Rußland," Berichte des BIOSt, Nr. 48, 1994, pp. 6-8. 
Moral Crisis or Immoral Society? 25 
(565) The Age Distribution of Respondents Who Regard the Practices Listed as Never 
Justified (1996) 
 18-29 29-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ total 
Avoiding fare on publich 
transport 12 18 26 26 29 41 23 
 
Tax evasion 18 19 34 45 43 52 31 
 
Buying stolen goods 40 53 58 60 74 74 57 
Taking drugs 70 84 87 92 90 90 84 
 
Keeping money 
you have found 18 28 33 45 49 56 34 
 
Lying in your 
own interest 18 25 27 46 49 51 32 
 
Accepting a bribe 47 59 68 77 80 82 66 
Resisting the police 23 25 27 36 44 44 31 
As the table shows, there is a significant correlation between age and strict moral principles. 
A kind of moral relativism is most prevalent among the youngest group of respondents, who 
also tend to regard good and bad as relative concepts. The "higher" morality displayed by the 
older generations can at least partly be explained by the general tendency of people to become 
more principled as they get older. Another explanation may be the continuing influence of 
communist moral education, which, for all its contradictions, embraced a number of moral 
principles that did not stem solely from communist ideology.9 
There are several matters in the list above in which Russian values notably differ from those 
in other European countries. One of these is tax evasion, which fewer than one-third of 
respondents (31%) think is never justified. For many people in Russia this is a new moral 
issue, because ordinary people were previously not responsible for deducting tax from their 
salaries. Secondly, in contemporary Russia, taxation legislation is extremely complicated and 
in many cases contradictory. This is one of the reasons why many companies try to find ways 
to evade taxes. The practice has become so widespread that it deprives the government of 
considerable revenues. In response the government has established a special tax police and 
                                                 
9 There is also a strong correlation between educational level and strict moral principles. The respondents with 
the lowest level of education most often expressed the opinion that certain matters were never justified. 
However, this tendency can also be explained by age, since elderly people predominate in the group with the 
lowest level of education (7 grades or less). 
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started a campaign against tax evasion in the mass media.10 This campaign has little 
credibility in the eyes of the population, which regards the authorities themselves as the 
biggest tax evaders. The issue of tax evasion is a good example of how difficult it is for 
Russians to reconcile their principles with the way things work in practice. By paying taxes 
citizens fulfil their obligations towards the state. However, if the state is not considered to be 
fulfilling its obligations to the population, then the motivation to pay taxes is not very great. 
Another issue on which Russians greatly differ from other Europeans is in their attitude to-
wards the police. Fewer than one third of respondents (31%) hold the opinion that it is never 
justified to resist the police. What this means in practice is that Russians do not trust the 
police. Even in the former Soviet Union it was possible to pay off the police in order to avoid 
prosecution and in the post-communist era corruption among the police has become much 
worse. It is not uncommon for the police threaten innocent people with arrest in order to 
extort money from them. In view of this it is not very surprising that most Russians think that 
resisting the police is justified, even though they also have a strong desire for law and order. 
It is in such paradoxes that the moral crisis of society is evident: only a small minority of the 
population trusts the state but a great majority wants a "strong state". 
5. The Influence of Russian Orthodoxy on Morality 
Russia is often said to be experiencing a "religious renaissance". One consequence of this is 
that both politicians and the Russian Orthodox Church have claimed that religion, especially 
Russian Orthodoxy, can solve the "moral crisis" in Russia. Is there any ground for these 
assertions? 
On the face of it, a "religious renaissance" is indeed taking place in Russia. Thousands of 
churches have been opened (or re-opened) and thousands of parishes established. The rebuild-
ing of the Christ the Saviour Cathedral (which Stalin had blown up in 1934) in Moscow has 
become a symbol of this "religious renaissance". Furthermore, it has become a common sight 
for politicians (most of whom were formerly atheists) to stand in front of icons with candles 
in their hands, especially when the media are present. Patriarch Alexii II accompanies 
President Yeltsin to various public occasions. However, none of this says anything about 
religious belief among ordinary Russians. 
It would be simplistic to imagine that the Russian Orthodox Church is in a position to lead 
Russia out of its current "moral crisis". While it is true that Orthodox doctrine embraces hu-
manist principles and provides moral guidelines for individuals, these principles are not com-
monly accepted. Furthermore, there is little Orthodox literature available on ethics that is up 
to date. Most works in that field were written in the late nineteenth or early twentieth 
centuries and have recently been re-published. Orthodox moral teachings, which are closely 
connected with theology and liturgy, are difficult to apply to the highly secularised Russia of 
                                                 
10 There are, however, quite practical reasons for this campaign: the International Monetary Fund has refused 
to grant Russia a loan of billions of dollars on the grounds that its taxation system is too inefficient. 
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today. Russian Orthodoxy does not accept the idea of natural law, but states that the human 
good is intimately bound up with the divine objective good because humanity is not only 
created in the image of God but also destined to become "like God", thereby achieving and 
realising true and full humanity, i. e. Theosis.11 Neither does Russian Orthodoxy have any 
social ethics. Furthermore, in a country that has a huge Islamic population and numerous 
other religious minorities, Orthodoxy can scarcely be considered as the solution to the "moral 
crisis". Finally, most Russians have no religious faith. 
The belief that Orthodoxy can save Russia from its current "moral crisis" attests to two 
aspects of the Russian mentality: nostalgia for pre-revolutionary Russia and the Russian habit 
of waiting for a miracle to happen rather than tackling the problem at hand. The nostalgic 
view of Russia before 1917 idealises it as a highly moral state guided by the principles of 
Russian Orthodoxy but disregards all the negative aspects of the tsarist regime and the 
dominance of one confession. Furthermore it ignores the question of whether pre-
revolutionary Russia has any relevance for Russian society today? 
5.1 How Religious Are Russians? 
According to various surveys there are signs of increasing religiosity in Russia, but it would 
be an exaggeration to speak of a "religious renaissance". Although the percentage of Russians 
who believe in God increased after the end of the communist regime--in 1991 one-third of 
respondents said they believed in God, whereas in 1993 the figure was 46%--the trend later 
levelled off, with an increase of only 1% between 1993 and 1996.12 
"Belief in God" is the most vague expression of religiousness and refers to any kind of belief 
in any god. Religious belief may also be conceptualised in terms of degrees of belief. One 
way of looking at religion is in terms of the individual's concern with discovering the purpose 
and meaning of life and of the beliefs he adopts to resolve that concern. According to Glock 
and Stark believers would then be defined as all those who have experienced this concern and 
have resolved it. Those who have this concern but who have not resolved it may be thought of 
as seekers. Non-believers would be those for whom the concern does not even exist.13 The 
term atheist, on the other hand, has a special meaning in Russia. An atheist was traditionally 
someone who was not only convinced that God does not exist but who adopted a consciously 
negative attitude towards religion. Thus, whereas a non-believer simply did not believe in 
God, an atheist was actively opposed to religion. 
The following statistics show how Russians' religious belief changed between 1991 and 1996: 
                                                 
11 N. O. Losskii, Bog i mirovoe zlo, Moscow, 1994, pp. 256-262. 
12 Most Russian surveys give a similar impression: in the early 1990s there was a rapid increase in 
religiousness, but this stagnated after a couple of years. See, for example, S. B. Filatov and D. E. Furman, 
"Religiya i politika v massovom soznanii", in Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya, No. 7, 1992, pp. 3-4; V. 
Borzenko, "Religiya v postkommunisticheskoi Rossii," in Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny, No. 8, 
1993, p. 5; and M. P. Mchedlov et al., "Religioznyi faktor v sotsial'no-politicheskoi zhizni Rossii," in 
Obnovlenie Rossii: trudnyi poisk reshenii, Moscow, 1994, pp. 149-151. 
13 Charles Glock – Rodney Stark, Religion and Society in Tension, Chicago, 1969, p. 27. 
28 Berichte des BIOst 1997 
Degrees of Religious Belief (1991-1996, in %) 
(340) Independently of whether you attend divine services or not, would you say you are... 
 
 1991 1993 1996 
A believer 23 32 34 
A seeker 28 28 30 
A non-believer 7 30 24 
An atheist 35  5  6 
Don't know  7  4  6 
The proportion of believers has increased since 1991, although this increase levelled off be-
tween 1993 and 1996. The most notable change was that between 1991 and 1993 the percent-
age of atheists fell sharply, whereas there was an explosion in the percentage of non-
believers. This may be explained by the fact that atheism was closely bound up with 
communist ideology, which was still the official ideology in the Soviet Union in January 
1991. When communism collapsed, atheism was discarded along with it; former atheists, 
however, did not become believers, they became non-believers. 
Obviously, there was no real change in conviction among the millions of people who 
"converted" from atheism to non-belief in two years. In post-communist Russia atheism was 
no longer politically relevant; indeed it was associated with numerous violations of human 
rights. For this reason, respondents who had previously classified themselves as atheists 
purely for political reasons now became non-believers.14 
The sudden rejection of atheism was typical of the tendency in Russia in the early 1990s to 
throw overboard all the values and symbols of the previous social order. Not infrequently 
norms and symbols were discarded before new social structures or regulating bodies could 
emerge to take their place. The reverse side of this sudden change was the idealisation of phe-
nomena that had been presented negatively by the communist regime. A very rosy picture of 
pre-revolutionary Russia was painted. To quote Mitrokhin: "On the ruins of one mythology 
another one, no less illusory, was hastily built up".15 
                                                 
14 Mitrokhin describes this process in the following manner: "As soon as the external ideological pressing came 
to weaken, the innermost feelings of protest and public wrath started shooting up, burying the amateur 
projects of perestroika superintendents. A result of this was the radical 'change of landmarks'. Atheism was 
now regarded as a synonym of immorality and inhumanity, and religion as a stronghold of morality and a 
single factor capable of holding the society back from the violence of spiritual vandalism. Step by step the 
ideological activity of State and Party structures which oversaw the ideological purity of the people died 
away and on-the-staff atheists likewise grew silent; without instruction 'from above' they were not 
accustomed to quarrel with God and, sadly enough these ceased to come." Lev Mitrokhin, "Post Communist 
Russia: Spiritual Renaissance and Religion," in Russian Culture at the Threshold of the Third Millennium of 
Christianity, Moscow, 1993, pp. 8-9. 
15 Ibid. 
Moral Crisis or Immoral Society? 29 
An examination of various demographic groups reveals that age played a significant role in 
each year of the study for all degrees of belief. In 1991 the proportion of believers was lower 
than the average (14-17%) in all groups between the ages of 18 and 49. The highest propor-
tion of believers was found among the older groups, reaching 55% among respondents aged 
70 years or more. In 1993 the proportion of believers increased in all age-groups and contin-
ued to do so slightly in 1996. 
In discussing religion Russians tend to use the terms "believe in God" and "believer" synony-
mously, and sometimes "believer" is assumed to mean "Orthodox believer". This, of course, 
suits the Russian Orthodox Church since it makes the Church look as if it has more members 
than is actually the case In fact the term "believer" is very vague and does not say anything 
about the form of belief (such as adherence to important religious doctrines) or about other 
dimensions of religion such as religious practice (frequency of attendance at divine services, 
frequency of prayer, etc.). In order to distinguish a group of Russians who can be regarded as 
religious, various dimensions of religion must be taken into account: 
1. Belief 
2. Knowledge or experience of religion – i.e., a person thinks that there is a God with whom 
one may have a personal relationship 
3. Follower of the Russian Orthodox Church (the institutional dimension) 
4. Regular attendance (at least once a month) at Church services (public religious practice) 
5. Frequent private prayer (private religious practice). 
A person is classified as a "true Orthodox believer" if the criteria 1-3 and 4 or 5 are fulfilled. 
In other words a "true Orthodox believer" expresses religiosity in the belief, experience, 
institutional and practice dimensions of religion. "Follower of the Russian Orthodox Church" 
has been chosen as a criterion because Orthodoxy is the dominant confession in Russia and 
because almost all respondents who regard themselves as adherents of a particular religious 
denomination regard themselves as Orthodox. The practice dimension is divided into public 
and private religious practice. Since some people may be unable to attend church services 
regularly for practical reasons (distance to the church or health problems, for instance) it 
suffices if a respondent either regularly attends divine services or prays often.16 
The criteria listed above do not, in fact, define a "true Orthodox believer" in the strict sense.17 
However, even these rather loose criteria were fulfilled by only 5% of respondents in 1996. If 
the "true Orthodox believers" are analysed according to demographic criteria it emerges that 
eight out of ten of them are women and two-thirds are over the age of fifty. While "true Or-
                                                 
16 This sum-variable was tested by examining the correlations between these criteria and positive correlations 
were significant.  
17 The criterion "God is regarded as very important" was left out, for instance; furthermore, belief in various 
non-Christian matters was accepted – belief in astrology is very prevalent among "true Orthodox believers". 
If more strict criteria were applied, the group would not be statistically significant. 
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thodox believers" are represented at all educational levels, half of them fall into the lowest 
category (7 grades or less). 
Most "true Orthodox believers" have had contact with religion at home. Eight out of ten of 
them say their mother and/or grandmother is/was a believer and more than half (62%) say 
their father is/was. In this respect they greatly differ from all other categories of respondents 
(only 2% of atheists say their father is/was a believer). 
More widespread than Orthodox belief in Russia is non-Christian belief and superstition of 
various kinds. More than one-third (37%) of respondents believe in astrology and 20% in re-
incarnation. Although these beliefs are not directly connected with any religion (even if the 
doctrine of re-incarnation exists in various religions), such people are still regarded as 
representatives of the "new religiousness" in Russia. 
Russians expressing some degree of religiousness thus fall into the following categories: 
1. The largest group (50-60%) consists of those who believe in God and/or have a positive 
attitude towards religion (believer or seeker). This group embraces all demographic 
categories. (In many Russian surveys these people are all classified as believers.) 
2. The second category consists of people who regard themselves as believers and who con-
sider religion either very important or rather important (30-35%). In this group women, 
elderly people and people with a lower level of education predominate. 
3. "True Orthodox believers" (5%) who express religiosity in various ways. These are 
believers who regard themselves as Orthodox and also practice religion either publicly or 
privately. The majority of "true Orthodox believers" are women aged 50 or more with a 
low level of education. "True Orthodox believers" have a strong religious background at 
home. 
4. Representatives of the "new religiousness" (12%) believe in astrology and re-incarnation. 
This is a vague form of religiousness which can be classified only as belief in the most 
general sense. The representatives of "new religiousness" are mostly young people with a 
religious background at home. 
5.2 The Effects of Religious Belief on Ethics 
The effects of religion on ethics can be examined in terms of a concept known as the 
"consequence dimension". The "consequence dimension" covers all religious prescriptions 
that specify how people should behave and the attitudes they ought to hold as a consequence 
of their religion. The notion of works, in the theological sense of the term, is connoted here. 
In the language of Christian belief, the "consequence dimension" deals with man's relation to 
man rather than with man's relation to God. The study of the consequences of varying degrees 
of commitment to religion follows the pattern of comparing various groups with regard to 
Moral Crisis or Immoral Society? 31 
their values in order to clarify whether religion does, in fact, have an effect on people's 
values.18 
The implications of religion for practical conduct are stated very explicitly in some religions 
and in some Christian traditions, though they may be very abstract in others. Various sects 
and other religious minorities often define clear religious imperatives for their members. In 
the more highly institutionalised religions and Christian denominations religiously inspired 
imperatives are less likely to inform the conduct of daily life in explicit ways. The religion 
sets general standards, which the individual is left to interpret for himself when he confronts 
the decisions of daily life in concrete circumstances. Despite these differences there is 
agreement among religions that consequences follow, or should follow, from religious 
commitment. Expectations of what a person should do as a result of being religious include 
both avoiding certain kinds of conduct and actively engaging in others.19 Even though 
Russian Orthodoxy does not emphasise ethical teachings as much as most Catholic and 
Protestant traditions it does, however, delineate certain moral principles which the adherents 
of that religion should follow. 
In order to examine the actual consequences of religious belief, respondents were divided into 
various groups according to the definitions of religiosity described earlier. Special attention is 
paid to "true Orthodox believers" who express religiosity in all the relevant dimensions of 
religion. However, in order to test whether it is religion that is responsible for their moral 
stance, "true Orthodox believers" were compared with the average population and with 
respondents with a weaker degree of religious commitment (believers, seekers, non-believers 
and atheists). The views of the "new religious" on some moral issues were also examined.20 
5.3 Religion and the Foundations for Morality 
The influence of religiousness on how people view the foundations for morality becomes evi-
dent in the following statistics: 
                                                 
18 Glock-Stark, pp. 21-22. 
19 Ibid., pp. 34-36. 
20 It should be stressed, however, that World Values surveys examine only attitudes and moral principles, not 
behaviour. They can, therefore, only show the influence of religiosity on values and moral principles, but not 
on whether these principles are put into practice. 
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The Distribution of Opinions Regarding the Foundations for Morality According to 
Religious Belief (1996, in %) 
(331) Here are two statements which people sometimes make when discussing good and evil. 
Which one comes closest to your own point of view? 
A. There are clear-cut criteria for defining what is good or evil. These always apply to every-
one, whatever the circumstances. 
B. Good and evil can never be clearly defined. What is good or evil depends entirely upon the 
circumstances at the time. 
 
 True Orth. Believer Seeker Non- Atheist New Total 
 Believer   Believer  religious. 
 
Clear-cut 
criteria 50 39 30 32 34 30 34 
 
Depends on 
circumstances 28 44 56 49 53 61 50 
 
Disagree with both 
Don't know 11 10  9 11  3  4 10 
As the table shows, religiousness plays a role in opinions concerning the foundations for mo-
rality. The percentage of believers who think that there are clear criteria for defining good and 
evil is considerably higher than the average. Conversely, the proportion of respondents in this 
group who think that "what is good and evil depends on the circumstances" is lower than the 
average. Half of the "true Orthodox believers" think that good and evil can be absolutely de-
fined. In other words , half of the "true Orthodox believers" follow the teachings of the 
Church on this matter, according to which moral relativism is unacceptable. According to 
Russian Orthodoxy, the criteria for defining good and evil are not based on ratio but are given 
by God and therefore absolute. 
If the influence of religiousness and age on people's views about the foundations for morality 
are compared, then it emerges that the proportion of "true Orthodox believers" who think that 
there are absolute criteria for defining good and evil is the same as among the oldest group of 
respondents. Therefore, it is not only religiousness but also age that influences opinions about 
the foundations for morality. The representatives of the "new religiousness" and other respon-
dents who have not clearly defined their world-view (seekers and non-believers) are most lib-
eral in their opinions about the foundations for morality. 
The oldest groups surveyed have been brought up, at least officially, according to communist 
principles. In the survey of 1996, for example, the respondents aged between 60 and 69 were 
born between the mid-1920s and mid-1930s and received their education after Stalin's 
"second revolution". Therefore, it is possible to claim that communist education has had a 
"positive" ethical influence by delineating a clear morality. This may be one explanation for 
the "higher" moral standards found among the older generations. Another, as mentioned 
earlier, is that people tend to become more principled as they grow older. However, it may 
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also be possible to attribute the higher moral standards of the older generations to religious 
upbringing: the older generations have more often than the average received a religious 
upbringing at home: 34% of those aged between 60 and 69 years and 45% of those over 
seventy say that they were brought up religiously, whereas the average is only 18%. Among 
the youngest respondents (18-39 years) only one in ten received a religious upbringing. 
5.4 Family Values, Sexual Morality and Religion 
Religions traditionally define certain moral principles for family life and for sexual morality. 
Russian Orthodoxy is no exception. In the following pages we examine to what extent 
religion influences moral principles and values in this field. 
Russians' attitudes towards relationships between parents and children were discussed earlier 
on. With regard to these questions "true Orthodox believers" and believers more often than 
other groups think that one should always love and respect one's parents; however, the differ-
ences are not significant and can be mostly explained by the influence of age, because "true 
Orthodox believers" answered in a similar manner to other elderly respondents. With regard 
to the question whether parents have a life of their own or whether they should sacrifice their 
life for their children, "true Orthodox believers" and believers more often than the average 
population supported the idea that parents should sacrifice their own well-being for the sake 
of their children. The representatives of "new religiousness", on the contrary, most often think 
that parents have a life of their own. In both cases, however, these attitudes were typical for 
the age-groups to which the respective categories of believer mainly belonged. Therefore, it 
may not be religiousness but age that plays the major role. 
Orthodoxy proscribes pre- and extra-marital sex. The following statistics show the 
distribution of opinions concerning sexual freedom: 
(423) Would you agree or disagree with the statement that people should be able to have total 
sexual freedom? 
 True Orth. Believer Seeker Non- Atheist New Total 
 believer   believer  religious. 
Tend to agree  4 12 18 15 18 25 16 
Tend to disagree 64 59 49 50 55 49 52 
Neither/depends  7 13 19 22 15 15 18 
Don't know 26 16 14 13 11 11 14 
With regard to sexual freedom the representatives of "new religiousness" are most liberal: 
one-quarter of them (25%) accept total sexual freedom. Here, too, however, age seems to play 
a major role, since the youngest generations that predominate this group are also most liberal 
with regard to sexual freedom. "True Orthodox believers" most often (64%) reject total sexual 
freedom. This cannot be explained merely by the influence of age; therefore in this case relig-
ion seems to play a decisive role. 
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Another question related to the issue of sexual freedom examined whether Russians accepted 
the idea of a woman wanting to have a child without having a permanent relationship with a 
man. 
(444) Do you accept the idea of a woman wanting to have a child without having a permanent 
relationship with a man? 
 True Orth. Believer Seeker Non- Atheist New Total 
 believer   believer  religious. 
Accept 30 34 42 40 40 45 38 
Do not accept 39 30 21 22 23 24 24 
Depends 27 31 33 34 29 28 33 
Don't know  5  5  4  4  8  3  5  
Here, there are clear differences between "true Orthodox believers" and the other groups: the 
percentage of "true Orthodox believers" who do not accept the idea of a woman wanting to 
have a child without having a permanent relationship with a man is considerably higher 
(39%) than the average (24%). Nevertheless, one-third of them did accept this idea and one-
quarter thought it depended on the situation. Thus, the majority of "true Orthodox believers" 
accept the idea of voluntary single parenthood to at least some degree. 
As for abortion, most religions, Christianity included, embrace the principle that life should 
always be respected and protected and this principle is usually extended to the unborn child. 
Russian Orthodoxy, like many other Christian traditions, views abortion as murder. 
According to Orthodoxy, life is a gift from God, and mankind does not have the right to 
destroy this gift. In line with this reasoning, no social or economic circumstance can justify 
abortion. However, some religious traditions that are basically opposed to abortion do accept 
it on certain medical grounds. The following tables show the distribution of opinions among 
people holding varying degrees of religious conviction regarding the four different indicators 
for abortion looked at earlier. 
(465) Would you accept an abortion in the following situations? 
A. When pregnancy could threaten the woman's health 
 
 True Orth. Believer Seeker Non- Atheist New Total 
 believer   believer  religious 
Accept 62 73 79 80 75 78 76 
Don't accept 22 17 15 12 14 13 15 
Don't know 15 10  6  8 11  9  9 
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B. When it is very probable that the child will be born with physical disabilities 
 
 True Orth. Believer Seeker Non- Atheist New Total 
 believer   believer  religious. 
Accept 61 75 87 86 76 88 81 
Don't accept 28 15  5  6 11  4  9 
Don't know 10 10  8  8 13  8  9 
 
C. When the woman is not married 
 
 True Orth. Believer Seeker Non- Atheist New Total 
 believer   believer  religious 
Accept 27 32 43 38 36 37 37 
Don't accept 44 42 32 35 41 39 37 
Don't know. 29 25 24 26 23 25 26 
 
D. When the parents do not want to have any more children 
 
 True Orth. Believer Seeker Non- Atheist New Total 
 believer   believer  religious. 
Accept 39 50 66 56 56 64 57 
Don't accept 47 30 20 26 25 18 25 
Don't know 14 19 14 18 19 17 18 
With regard to their opinions about abortion, "true Orthodox believers" clearly differ from the 
average population and from the other groups examined. In all the situations mentioned the 
proportion of "true Orthodox believers" who accept abortion is somewhat lower than the 
average. However, in situations where there is a medical reason for abortion two-thirds of 
them accept abortion and only one-quarter does not. "True Orthodox believers" and the 
average population differ most over the question of whether abortion is justified when the 
parents do not want to have any more children. Nevertheless, even here fewer than half of the 
"true Orthodox believers" did not accept abortion. The representatives of "new religiousness" 
are most liberal with regard to abortion. However, age seems to play a major role among both 
the "true Orthodox believers" and the representatives of "new religiousness" – both groups 
answered in a similar way to the age-groups that predominate these categories. Generally 
speaking, religion does seem to have some influence on opinions about abortion; however, 
established traditions in Russia also play a significant role. 
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Religion also had some influence on those aspects of sexual morality that were examined 
using a ten-point scale. The following table shows how those who expressed the most 
negative opinions (never justified) concerning certain matters of sexual morality were 
distributed according to religious belief. 
(565) The Distribution According to Religious Belief of Respondents Who Thought That 
Various Practices Were Never Justified (1996, %) 
 
 True Orth. Believer Seeker Non- Atheist New Total 
 believer   believer  religious 
Married persons  
having an affair 53 42 32 33 41 28 36 
Homosexuality 79 75 69 74 83 70 72 
Prostitution 76 67 63 61 66 59 63 
Divorce 10 10  6  6  6  6  8 
Religious people condemn homosexuality only slightly more often than others; interestingly, 
the percentage of atheists who thought that homosexuality was never justified was higher than 
in other groups. With regard to the other matters mentioned, "true Orthodox believers" had 
slightly more strict principles than the other groups. As for the first issue, only half of "true 
Orthodox believers" (53%) have embraced the teachings of the Church and think that it is 
never justified for married persons to have an affair. According to Russian Orthodoxy, 
sexuality is a gift from God that materialises in marriage. Furthermore, according to 
Orthodoxy marriage is not only a social institution but also a sacrament. Prostitution is 
generally regarded as never justified: more than six out of ten people in each group shared 
this opinion, with a slightly higher percentage among "true Orthodox believers" than among 
the others. With regard to divorce "true Orthodox believers" differ only slightly from the 
other groups. Therefore, they clearly do not regard marriage as a sacrament but as a social 
institution that may end in divorce for a number of reasons. In looking at the rather high 
proportions of "true Orthodox believers" and believers who think that the practices listed are 
never justified, it should be borne in mind that these groups are dominated by elderly people, 
who generally have stricter moral principles; therefore, it is not only religion but also age that 
influences attitudes to sexual morality. 
5.5 Work Ethics and Religion 
There are two groups that clearly differ from the average with regard to work motivation: 
"true Orthodox believers" and atheists. In both groups 43% of respondents say that they 
always do their best independent of the salary. As far as "true Orthodox believers" are 
concerned this percentage differs only slightly from that of women, who dominate this group. 
Among atheists, however, this high proportion cannot be explained by gender or age. It 
would, therefore, appear that a responsible attitude towards work stems from factors other 
than religion. 
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At the same time, atheists more often than the average regard work as a commodity: one-third 
(32%) of them share this view. All in all they have a positive, active attitude towards work: 
only 13% of atheists say that working is a necessity and that they would not work if they did 
not have to. "True Orthodox believers", on the contrary, quite seldom regard work as a com-
modity: only 14% of them share this view, whereas one-quarter (22%) of them regard work as 
a necessity and say they would not work if they did not have to. Here, too, however, these 
percentages are similar to those among female respondents; therefore, it is not only religion 
that influences these attitudes. 
5.6 Social Issues and Religion 
Religion did not seem to have any significant influence on most of the social issues examined 
earlier. Atheists generally expressed more responsible attitudes than other groups. The 
following statistics show the distribution of opinions according to religious belief regarding 
the questions that were examined earlier in terms of age. 
(565) The Distribution According to Religious Belief of Respondents Who Thought That 
Various Practices Were Never Justified (1996, in %) 
 
 True Orth. Believer Seeker Non- Atheist New Total 
 Believer   believer  Religious 
 
Avoiding fare on 
public transport 24 24 21 23 31 15 23 
 
Tax evasion 37 35 27 30 42 22 31 
Buying stolen goods 70 62 57 52 61 49 57 
Taking drugs 93 89 86 83 85 83 84 
 
Keeping money 
you have found 47 41 31 30 40 26 34 
 
Lying in your 
own interest 39 39 27 26 42 29 32 
 
Accepting a bribe 75 69 64 66 68 64 66 
Resisting the police 31 33 28 32 29 31 31 
"True Orthodox believers" and believers have more strict moral principles than others on 
most of the issues listed. However, these groups also consist mainly of older people who are 
generally more principled than younger people. It, therefore, seems to be age, not religion, 
that influences social moral principles. On almost all issues respondents aged 60 and above 
held stricter moral principles than "true Orthodox believers". The only exception was the 
issue of drugs on which "true Orthodox believers" expressed the most negative attitudes. By 
contrast, "true Orthodox believers" do not differ from the average population regarding the 
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issue of fare-dodging. Furthermore, they express considerably more lax moral principles than 
the age-groups to which they mainly belong. The same goes for the issue of lying in your own 
interest. These moral questions are, naturally, more relevant to the everyday lives of "true 
Orthodox believers" than the question of taking drugs. Thus, they hold stricter moral 
principles only with regard to matters which are "theoretical" for them and with which they 
are not confronted on a daily basis. 
On most issues atheists come second after "true Orthodox believers" and believers in terms of 
holding strict moral principles. However, there are some matters of social responsibility and 
honesty on which they take the most principled stand. This applies particular to the issues of 
fare-dodging and tax evasion, where the percentage of respondents who think these practices 
are never justified is higher among atheists than among any other group. A similar trend is 
observable regarding the question about lying in your own interest. As mentioned earlier, age 
does not explain atheists' values, because they are distributed more or less evenly among all 
age-groups. 
This examination of the correlation between religious belief and morality leads one to 
conclude that Russian Orthodoxy is not the solution to the "moral crisis" in Russia. Only one-
third of Russians regard themselves as believers and only 5% fulfil the criteria used by the 
survey to define "true Orthodoxy". Furthermore, "true Orthodox believers" consist mainly of 
elderly women with a low level of education. On several issues of morality they expressed 
"higher" moral principles than other respondents with a similar demographic background. 
However, on some matters of sexual morality (abortion and divorce, for instance) Soviet 
traditions seemed to have more influence on "true Orthodox believers" than the doctrines of 
the Church. Atheists tended to express a high degree of social responsibility and honesty. It 
is, however, difficult to clarify what an atheist's motivation is for adhering to high moral 
standards. It may have its roots in communist moral doctrine, but it may equally well be based 
on humanism. 
6. Lifeworld Versus Systems 
The survey has shown that the Russians (with the exception of the youngest generation) hold 
relatively "high" moral principles which do not notably differ from those held in most Euro-
pean countries. These, however, stand in contrast to the many "immoral" aspects of Russian 
society, such as widespread corruption, increasing criminality, etc. It is these negative 
phenomena and the lack of commonly accepted ethical foundations following the collapse of 
communism that have lead people to use the expression "moral crisis" to describe 
contemporary Russian society. Thus, there seems to be a contradiction: while Russians hold 
"normal" moral principles, these cannot be applied in everyday life. How can this 
contradiction be explained? 
The concepts of lifeworld and systems developed by Jürgen Habermas offer a theoretical 
framework for explaining this contradiction. The concept lifeworld refers to people's everyday 
life (family, friends, etc.) and to all the phenomena related to it. The concept systems, on the 
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other hand, refers to the institutions of society (the political and economic systems, juridical 
institutions, established patterns of social life, etc.). As has been shown above, most Russians 
have a very responsible attitude to matters connected with their lifeworld. These matters are 
also regarded as most important. In addition, older people in particular, express a responsible 
attitude to a number of social issues and to the systems of Russian society. However, society 
functions in such a way that it is often extremely difficult to live according to one's principles. 
The following examples may be used to illustrate the point: 
The first example: most Russians (66%) think that it is never justified to accept bribes. How-
ever, giving and accepting small or even large bribes is an established feature of Russian 
society which was also widespread under the communist regime. This practice began among 
the nomenclatura and was used by ordinary people when they wanted to get something 
accomplished involving local officials, for example. In this respect little has changed since 
the end of the communist regime. Although most people think that it is never justified to 
accept bribes, at the same time they live in a society in which bribes are an established feature 
of the system, i.e., where the system puts pressure on people to act against their principles. 
The second example: A Russian businessman would like to be honest, declare all his profits 
and pay all the taxes required by law. But he faces two major problems: if he pays all his 
taxes he will have almost nothing left and in declaring his income some mafia group may find 
out how much profit he is making and try to blackmail him and his family. Even if this 
businessman would like to live in a morally correct way, the existing system makes it 
impossible. The third example: A babushka would like to visit her grandchildren in another 
suburb but she has not received her pension for the last three months and hardly has anything 
to eat. She plans to use public transport but cannot afford to buy a ticket. In principle she 
thinks that it is never justified to avoid paying one's fare on public transport, but on this 
occasion she acts against her principles. Should this babushka be termed immoral, or is it 
society with its numerous structures that make "normal" life impossible that should be termed 
immoral? 
Churches have traditionally played a mediating role between lifeworld and systems and on 
many occasions have opposed the "immoral" structures of society. The Russian Orthodox 
Church, however, has a long tradition of co-operating with the authorities, and this tradition 
seems to be continuing. The Russian Orthodox Church is highly respected by the majority of 
Russians and by the state authorities as well; therefore it could play a significant mediating 
role between lifeworld and systems – a challenge that it is currently not meeting. 
While there is much "moral potential" among ordinary Russians, in contemporary Russian so-
ciety it is often difficult to live according to one's principles (as was also the case under the 
communist regime). In this sense the "moral crisis" exists primarily at the level of systems. 
Given, however, that adherence to moral principles is least strict among the younger genera-
tions the "moral crisis" may well spread to the individual sphere in the future. 
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Moral Crisis or Immoral Society? 
Russian Values after the Collapse of Communism 
Bericht des BIOst Nr. 26/1997 
Summary 
Introductory Remarks 
There is currently much talk of a "moral crisis" or a loss of values in Russia. With the 
collapse of the Soviet regime the commonly accepted values and moral principles of 
communism were discarded, leaving a kind of moral vacuum. At the same time, Russia saw 
the emergence of a number of negative social phenomena, in particular a sharp rise in crime. 
By contrast, a survey of individual Russians reveals an adherence to moral principles 
comparable with that of people in most other European countries. Thus, while Russian society 
does indeed seem to be undergoing a moral crisis, the values of individuals have remained 
relatively intact. 
Contemporary Russian society is characterised not so much by a lack of values as by a myriad 
of competing ideological and religious movements each offering its own value system. In this 
respect, Russia does not differ all that much from other European countries. What is different 
is the ideological background: after living for decades under a one-party system Russians are 
unaccustomed to discriminating between different ideologies. Amid the "jungle" of 
conflicting viewpoints, young people, in particular, find it difficult to form a coherent view of 
the world with a defined value system. For all that, most Russians hold clear moral principles 
concerning various areas of life. 
The primary sources for this study are three World Values surveys conducted in Russia in 
January 1991 (when the communist system was still in place), in August 1993 and in March-
April 1996. On each occasion 1,500-2,000 people were interviewed all over Russia. The em-
pirical data thus gathered form part of a joint research project between the Academy of 
Finland and the Russian Academy of Sciences. It is published here for the first time. 
Findings 
1. The former official ideology, Marxism-Leninism, has been discarded and the old ideals 
and moral principles that formed part of communist education no longer hold common cur-
rency. Thus, on the theoretical level there is a crisis of moral outlooks in Russia. In 
practice, however, people had ceased to pay much attention to communist principles long 
before the collapse of the communist system. By the time the Soviet regime fell, the 
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majority of the population believed that there were no clear-cut criteria for defining "good" 
and "bad". This attitude has not changed much in the post-communist era. Young people, 
especially, find it difficult to identify moral principles to guide their lives. 
2. Russians regard the family as the most important area of life: 94% of those questioned said 
they regarded it as important. Russian family values and attitudes to sexual morality have 
been shaped by a number of influences. First of all, the Russian tradition is very strongly 
family-orientated and has remained so despite the influence of the West, with its increasing 
emphasis on individualism. At the same time, Russian attitudes to certain aspects of sexual 
morality clearly bear the mark of communist ideology and of Soviet reality. In these areas 
Russians hold rather different views from their European counterparts. 
3. One area in which there has been a major shift in values is work. While the older genera-
tions generally have a responsible attitude to work and the majority of them are always 
willing to do their best independent of their salary, younger people regard the employment 
relationship as a contract under which they are prepared to work more if they receive more 
money. Most Russians have a positive attitude to competition, although their enthusiasm 
has waned steadily since the early years of economic reform. A similar trend is observable 
regarding attitudes to hard work. More people than before think that it is not hard work but 
connections that bring a better life. This applies particularly to the younger generation. Al-
though most Russians still think that the size of a person's salary should depend on his per-
formance, the number of people saying they favoured greater equality of incomes rose con-
siderably between 1991 and 1996. Not surprisingly, this opinion shift was most 
pronounced among those who had suffered the most under the economic transformation, i. 
e. among older and less well-educated people. 
4. When asked to say what the most essential tasks of the state were, Russians listed practical 
matters, such as stabilising the economy, maintaining order in the country or fighting 
crime, ahead of more abstract goals, such as defending freedom of speech. Another section 
of the survey concerned the issue of mutual trust. Here an alarming increase in the level of 
mistrust was observable between 1991 and1996; today a large majority of the Russian 
population does not trust other people. Another disturbing trend is the lack of moral 
principles among the younger generation with regard to social responsibility. 
5. The Russian Orthodox Church preaches adherence to strict moral principles, but these 
teachings are not widely accepted. The survey revealed, however, that only one third of 
Russians regard themselves as believers; moreover, only 5% of Russians met the criteria 
used by the study to define "true Orthodox believers" and those fitting into this category 
were mainly elderly women with a low level of education. Furthermore, it was only on 
some issues that they displayed a stronger adherence to moral principles than non-
Orthodox respondents with a similar demographic background. Those declaring 
themselves atheists, on the other hand, seemed to be rather principled people, especially 
with regard to issues of social responsibility and honesty. There appears to be no evidence, 
therefore, for the assertion that Orthodoxy is the solution to the "moral crisis" in Russia. 
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6. The moral principles espoused by ordinary Russians differ little from those held by people 
in most other European countries. However, many features of Russian society, such as 
widespread corruption or rising crime, point to an increasingly "immoral" society. 
Therefore, while many ordinary Russians hold quite high moral principles it is difficult to 
live according to these principles under contemporary conditions (as was also the case 
under the communist regime). In this sense the "moral crisis" is primarily a crisis of the 
system. At the same time, the lack of moral principles among many young people bodes ill 
for the future. In other words the "moral crisis" can be expected to worsen. 
 
